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Abstract: It seemed to be a settled principle of law that before an 
employee can be dismissed from his job for misconduct, he must have 
a notice of the allegation against him and accorded a reasonable 
opportunity of being heard. However, this principle should be revisited 
in the light of two conflicting Federal Court’s decisions pertaining 
to the mandatory issue of this right especially in the private sector 
employment in Malaysia. The curable principle as enunciated by 
Dreamland Corporation (M) Sdn. Bhd. v Choong Chin Sooi & Anor 
[1988] 1 MLJ 111 has watered down the right of the employee to 
be heard as it was held in that case that the irregularity in holding 
a domestic enquiry is not fatal to the employer. He may justify 
the dismissal at the Industrial Court. Despite the existence of this 
principle, it should be emphasised that the right to a pre-dismissal 
hearing should be interpreted to be mandatory and not discretionary 
as there are two statutory provisions and constitutionally recognised 
rules of natural justice which may support this proposition. The 
mandatory effect of the domestic enquiry should be consistently 
upheld. With a view to enhance the employee’s right and to ensure 
harmonious employer-employee relationship, it would be the purpose 
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of this article to comparatively examine and learn how the same 
right is treated and regulated under the Islamic principle of justice 
and its application in two Islamic countries, namely Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Apart from narrowing down the gap in 
the Islamic knowledge on the administration of justice in dismissal 
cases, this article may also contribute in idea on how to harmonise 
the current employment laws and the Sharia. 
Keywords: Workers, Dismissals, Misconduct, Natural justice, 
Islam.
Abstrak: Ianya seolah-olah telah menjadi satu prinsip undang-
undang yang mantap di mana sebelum seseorang pekerja boleh 
dipecat daripada pekerjaannya kerana salah laku, dia mesti diberikan 
notis pertuduhan terhadapnya dan peluang yang munasabah untuk 
didengar. Walau bagaimanapun, prinsip ini perlu dikaji semula 
dengan mengambil kira dua keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan yang 
bercanggah mengenai isu mandatori hak ini terutamanya dalam 
sektor pekerjaan swasta di Malaysia. Prinsip ‘pembetulan’ (curable) 
seperti yang dikemukakan oleh Dreamland Corporation (M) Sdn. v 
Choong Chin Sooi & Anor [1988] 1 MLJ 111 telah mengurangkan 
hak pekerja untuk didengar kerana telah diputuskan di dalam kes 
tersebut bahawa ketidakteraturan dalam mengadakan siasatan 
domestik tidak ‘membawa padah’ (fatal) kepada majikan. Dia 
boleh menjustifikasikan pemecatan itu di Mahkamah Perusahaan. 
Walaupun wujudnya prinsip ini, perlu ditekankan bahawa hak untuk 
didengar sebelum pemecatan harus ditafsirkan sebagai mandatori 
dan tidak bergantung kepada budi bicara kerana terdapat dua 
peruntukan statut dan peraturan keadilan semulajadi yang diiktiraf 
perlembagaan yang boleh menyokong prinsip ini dan kesan 
mandatori dalam siasatan domestik haruslah ditegakkan secara 
konsisten. Dengan maksud untuk meningkatkan hak pekerja dan 
memastikan perhubungan majikan dan pekerja yang harmoni, adalah 
menjadi tujuan artikel ini untuk mengkaji secara perbandingan dan 
mempelajari bagaimana hak yang sama diperlakukan dan diatur di 
bawah prinsip keadilan Islam dan aplikasinya di dua negara Islam, 
iaitu Kerajaan Arab Saudi dan UAE. Selain daripada merapatkan 
jurang pengetahuan Islam mengenai pentadbiran keadilan di 
dalam kes-kes pemecatan, artikel ini juga boleh menyumbangkan 
idea tentang bagaimana untuk mengharmonikan undang-undang 
pekerjaan dan Syariah atau menjadikannya patuh Syariah melalui 
pindaan statutori yang dicadangkan.  
   
Kata Kunci: Pekerja, Pemecatan, Salah laku, Keadilan semulajadi, 
Islam.
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INTRODUCTION
The right to be heard or audi alteram partem is a principle of natural 
justice that no man should be condemned unheard or both sides 
to a dispute must be heard. Natural justice is defined as “justice 
administered without reference to statute in the decision of the law 
court where the judge is being guided by what is called conscience 
of the natural sense of what is right or wrong.” (Balakrishnan & 
Balakrishnan, 2007).1 In the employment context, this may mean 
that even if there is no statutory provision to impose the giving of the 
right to be heard to an employee accused of a certain misconduct, 
under the doctrine of procedural fairness2 the right must be observed 
during domestic enquiries in the private sector and similarly, in 
disciplinary proceedings in the public sector before an employee is 
penalised. The normal range of requirements under the natural justice 
of the right to be heard rule are the requirement of the notice of 
allegation, a consideration of the need for an oral hearing, disclosure 
of evidence,  the opportunity of cross examination  and the need for 
legal representation.3  
Despite what seems to be the above commonly held view, the issue 
of whether or not the holding of a domestic enquiry to give an 
employee the right to be heard is mandatory or not is still unsettled 
in Malaysia, particularly in the private sector employment. This is 
due to the two contradictory Federal Court’s cases deciding on this 
matter. The first case of Dreamland Corporation (M) Sdn. Bhd. v 
Choong Chin Sooi & Anor4 held that failure to conduct an enquiry 
at the workplace prior to termination was not fatal to the company’s 
case. Even though there was a breach of the rules of natural justice, 
it could be cured in a subsequent hearing of the matter when it 
is referred to the Industrial Court. On the other hand, the second 
case of Said Dharmalingam bin Abdullah v Malayan Breweries5 
decided that the failure on the part of the employer to hold a 
 
1 Balakrishnan, M., & Balakrishnan, P. (2007). Misconduct, domestic enquiry and 
the rules of natural justice in the context of Malaysian employment relations, 
Malayan Law Journal Articles (6), 149-163. 
2 Sundra-Karean, V. (2012). Employment law and theory. Malaysia. The 
Malaysian Current Law Journal Sdn Bhd., 165. 
3 Ibid.
4  [1988] 1 MLJ 111.
5  [1997] AMR 1063. 
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pre-dismissal enquiry could not be cured by the hearing before the 
Industrial Court. The right was treated as mandatory by this case, at 
least for those who were covered under the Employment Act 19556. 
Therefore, failure to observe the procedural right would enable the 
employee to claim for reinstatement to his former position.7 When 
the curable principle in Dreamland was extended in the subsequent 
case of Milan Auto Sdn Bhd v Wong Seh Yen8 to employees covered 
by the Employment Act 1955, a real confusion occurred. As a result, 
an employee may not expect equal and consistent treatment of the 
law with another employee in any dismissal proceedings anymore 
and an unscrupulous employer may escape any liability whatsoever 
for dismissing his employee without conducting a domestic enquiry 
prior to that. The Industrial Court has grappled with this mandatory 
issue for years and at times arrived at conflicting decisions (Ayadurai, 
19989 ; Maimunah, 201310). This unsatisfactory state of law should 
not be allowed to continue. There is an overwhelming number of 
unfair dismissal disputes based on misconduct as can be seen from 
the statistics in Table 1 below.
In light of the current issue above, this article will, in turn, examine 
how the same pre-dismissal right is treated based on the Islamic 
principle of justice and its application and discuss the possibilities 
of adapting or adopting the Islamic approach in order to resolve it. 
This study, particularly involves a comparative analysis on the right 
to be heard in the Malaysian employment context with the Islamic 
6 It should be noted that the Federal Court differentiated Said Dharmalingam 
with Dreamland because the employee in Said Dharmalingam fell under the 
purview of the Employment Act 1955 where there was a specific statutory due 
enquiry requirement of s. 14(1) applicable to him.  
7 S 20 (1) Industrial Relations Act 1967. If proven to be impracticable, applying s 
30 (6) of the same Act, compensation in lieu would be granted as  s 30(6) states 
“in making its award, the Court shall not be restricted to the specific relief 
claimed by the parties or to the demands made by the parties in the course of 
the trade dispute or in the matter of the reference to it under ss. 20(3) but may 
include in the award any matter or thing which it thinks necessary or expedient 
for the purpose of settling the trade dispute or the reference to it under ss. 
20(3).”
8 [1995] 3 MLJ 537. 
9 Ayadurai, D. (1998). Industrial relations in Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: Malayan 
Law Journal Sdn Bhd, at 160.
10  Maimunnah Aminuddin. (2013). Malaysian industrial relations & employment 
law, 8th ed. Malaysia: McGraw Hill Education (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd., at 257.
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principle of justice and its application. Based on the Sharia law, 
the employee’s pre-dismissal right to be heard is mandatory except 
where there is an admission of guilt on the part of the employee. 
This mandatory effect is clearly stipulated in the statutory provisions 
of the Islamic countries selected.  This study may contribute in 
narrowing down the gap in the Islamic knowledge especially on 
the administration of employees’ procedural fairness rules before 
dismissal. As amendments to the relevant laws are time consuming, 
another separate research on the practicality of harmonising the 
current labour laws and Sharia by interpretation in accordance to 
the Islamic concept of Siyasah Syar’iyyah11 and Maslahah12 may be 
required to enhance the employees’ pre-dismissal right.




2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Constructive 140 135 91 96 86 87 81
Misconduct 613 608 639 540 567 457 477
Retrenchment 114 67 90 62 91 59 57
Others 328 479 640 735 818 545 527
TOTAL 1195 1289 1460 1433 1562 1148 1142
 
11 ‘Siyasah Syar’iyyah’ is a broad doctrine of Islamic law which authorises the ruler 
to determine the manner in which the Sharia should be administered. It allows 
the ruler to take discretionary measures, enact rules and initiate policies as he 
deems are in the interest of a good government, provided that no substantive 
principle of Sharia is violated. Refer Mohamad Hashim Kamali (1989). Siyasah 
Shar’iyah or the Policies of Islamic Government.  The American Journal of 
Islamic Social Sciences (6:9), 59-80.
12  Maslahah’ is defined as “public interest; a basis of law. According to necessity 
and particular circumstances, it consists of prohibiting or permitting something 
on the basis of whether or not it serves the public’s benefit or welfare. The con-
cept of public interest can be very helpful in cases not regulated by the Quran, 
Sunnah, or qiyas (analogy). Here, equitable considerations can override the 
results of strict analogy, taking into account the public’s welfare.” Refer J.L. 
Esposito. ‘The Oxford Dictionary of Islam: Oxford Islamic studies Online’ 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1459, (accessed 24 
July 2016).
13 Maziah Maon, Assistant Registrar, Industrial Court of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 
“Re: Statistics of Analysis of Awards of Dismissal Cases”, E-mail to Junaidah 
Abd. Karim, 1 June 2016. 
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EMPLOyEES’ PRE-DISMISSAL RIGHT IN MALAySIA
Public servants’ pre-dismissal right to be heard in Malaysia is clearly 
mandatory. Their right is expressly guaranteed by the Malaysian 
Constitution art 135(2) where it provides that “no member of such 
a service as aforesaid (public service as defined in art 132) shall 
be dismissed or reduced in rank without being given a reasonable 
opportunity of being heard…” This right is further emphasised by reg 
34(1) of the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2002 (P.U. (A) 246/2002)14 and procedurally regulated 
by reg 37 of the same regulation. It is clear-cut that the right is 
mandatory in the public service as evidenced in Surinder Singh 
Kanda v Government of the Federation of Malaya15, GP & Anor v 
Alan Noor bin Kamat16 and Phang Moh Shin v Comm. of Police17. 
In Surinder Singh Kanda, the Privy Council defined the basic 
components of a right to be heard and highlighted that both sides in 
dispute must be heard. It was stated in that case that:
If the right to be heard is to be a real right which is worth 
anything, it must carry with it a right in the accused 
man to know the case which is made against him. He 
must know what evidence has been given and what 
statements have been made affecting him, and then he 
must be given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict 
them. This appeared in all the cases from the celebrated 
judgment of Lord Loreburn, L.C. in Board of Education 
v. Rice down to the decision of their Lordships’ Board 
in Ceylon University v. Fernando. It follows, of course, 
that the judge or whoever has to adjudicate must not 
hear evidence or received representations from one side 
behind the back of the other. The Court will not enquire 
whether the evidence or representations did work to his 
prejudice. Sufficient that they might do so. The Court 
will not go into the likelihood of prejudice. The risk of 
it is enough.
 
14 Regulation 34 (1) states that “subject to subregulation (2), no officer shall 
be dismissed or reduced in rank in any disciplinary proceedings under this 
Part unless he has first been informed in writing of the grounds on which such 
action is proposed and he has been afforded a reasonable opportunity of being 
heard.
15  [1962] 1 MLJ 168, [1962] 28 MLJ 169, P.172.
16  [1988] 1 MLJ 260.
17  [1967] 2 MLJ 186.
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In contrast, it is uncertain whether or not the employees in the private 
sector employment have a pre-dismissal right to be heard due to the 
undesirable effect of the case of Dreamland as extended by Milan 
Auto. The uncertain application of the curable principle has resulted 
in confusion in the Industrial Court in making its award with regard 
to the mandatory effect of the right. Subsequently, there are three 
splitting trends in the Industrial Court cases (Kamal Halili, 2001).18 
First, cases which decided that the absence of domestic enquiry is 
curable. Second, cases where the court reprimanded the employer 
who did not conduct the domestic enquiry but still continued to 
hear the case on merit and decided whether or not the dismissal was 
with just cause and excuse. Third, cases that decided that domestic 
enquiry must be held before dismissing the employee. These splitting 
trends can be used as an evidence to support Anantaraman’s earlier 
claim that the Malaysian case law governing procedural rectitude in 
dismissal for misconduct is in the state of flux.19 
 
In spite of the current position above, it may be argued that the right 
to a pre-dismissal hearing or better known as domestic enquiry in the 
private sector employment should be interpreted to be mandatory and 
not discretionary.  There are two main statutory provisions and the 
common law rules of natural justice in support of this proposition. 
In addition to that, it may also be argued that the application of the 
curable principle should be very limited if not discarded at all due 
to its weak foundation and the mandatory effect of the domestic 
enquiry should be consistently upheld. 
  
The main statutory basis for the mandatory effect of domestic 
enquiry can be found under s 14(1) of the Employment Act 1955 
(Act 365) where it stipulates:
An employer may, on the grounds of misconduct 
inconsistent with the fulfilment of the express or implied 
conditions of his service, after due enquiry
(a)  dismiss without notice to the employee, 
(b)  downgrade the employee, or 
(c)  impose any other lesser punishment as he deems just 
and fit. And where a punishment of suspension without 
wages is imposed, it shall not exceed a period of two 
weeks.
18 Kamal Halili Hassan. (2001). Siasatan domestik: Trend dan pendirian mahkamah 
perusahaan, 1995-2001.  ILR (4), i-x. 
19 Anantaraman, V. (1997). Malaysian industrial relations, law & practice. 
Selangor, Malaysia: Universiti Putra Malaysia Press, at 269.
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It is clear that this provision makes it necessary to hold a ‘due 
enquiry’ prior to the infliction of punishment for misconduct and 
the Industrial Court has consistently applied so in its awards.20 
However, this provision offers limited protection as it applies only 
to ‘employee’ as categorised by the Act and amongst others,21 whose 
monthly salary does not exceed RM2000 per month.  
  
The second statutory proviso that could be the basis for the mandatory 
effect of the right is s 20(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 
(Act 177). Theoretically, the spectrum of s 20(1) of the Industrial 
Relations Act 1967 is broader than s 14(1) Employment Act 1955 
as the Act protects all ‘workmen’22, regardless of their salary, for as 
long as they are under a ‘contract of service’. S 20(1) of the Industrial 
Relations Act 1967 provides:
Where a workman, irrespective of whether he is a 
member of a trade union of workmen or otherwise, 
considers that he has been dismissed without just cause 
or excuse by his employer, he may make representations 
in writing to the Director General to be reinstated in his 
former employment; the representations may be filed at 
the office of the Director General nearest to the place of 
employment from which the workman was dismissed.
Even though there is no express word requiring any enquiry, the 
above provision requires that a dismissal be with ‘just cause and 
excuse’. What exactly ‘just cause and excuse’ means is not clear but 
the persistent question to be answered here is whether the phrase 
‘just cause and excuse’ requires compliance with the ‘procedural 
20 See for example Rumah Kebajikan Kanak-Kanak Taiping v Kamal Bhai GL 
Naidu (1995) 1 ILR 92, Nagai Metal Traders Sdn Bhd Johor v Ramanaidoo 
Mallanaido [1997] 2 ILR 887, Pro Ads & Co v Lo Lai Choo [1997[ 3 ILR 
1025 and  Poh Loy Earthworks Sdn Bhd v Mohd Nasaruddin Taib [1997] 3 ILR 
608.
21 The Act is applicable to those who are earning more than RM2000 if the 
‘employee’ falls within the ambit of specific jobs as mentioned in s 2(1) First 
Schedule, Employment Act 1955.  
22 According to s 2 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967, ‘workman’ means “any 
person, including an apprentice, employed by an employer under a contract of 
employment to work for hire or reward and for the purposes of any proceedings 
in relation to a trade dispute includes any such person who has been dismissed, 
discharged or retrenched in connection with or as a consequence of that dispute 
or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute.” 
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fairness’ as well as the ‘substantive fairness’ rule. The Federal Court 
in Wong Yuen Hock v Syarikat Hong Leong Assurance Sdn. Bhd.23, 
in following Dreamland, was of the view that the wording of s 
20(1) and s 20(3)24 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 limits the 
Industrial Court’s jurisdiction to review cases on substantive merit 
only and not to consider whether or not the dismissal was carried 
out in accordance with the rules of natural justice or procedural 
fairness. 
 
Before scrutinising the decision of the cases above, the researcher first 
laid down the facts and the reasoning behind them. In Dreamland, 
Choong, the employee, a project manager, was dismissed with 
immediate effect without any enquiry because of his persistent 
casual and indifferent attitude towards his responsibilities and for 
provoking and instigating dissatisfaction among fellow workers. The 
first respondent argued that his dismissal was without just cause or 
excuse and contrary to the principles of natural justice. The reference 
was made to the Industrial Court under s 20(3) Industrial Relations 
Act 1967. The Industrial Court, after its own enquiry, held that 
Choong’s dismissal was justified as he had committed misconduct 
but as there was no enquiry held by the employer, the effective date 
of dismissal would be the last date of enquiry and he was entitled 
to back wages. The Industrial Court interpreted the words “just 
cause or excuse” under s 20(1) Industrial Relations Act 1967 to 
mean not only the reason for the dismissal but also the manner of 
the dismissal, particularly the rules of natural justice. The award 
later was referred to the High Court on two questions of law: (a) 
Does the Industrial Court have jurisdiction to award compensation 
to a workman whose dismissal has been upheld by the court?, and 
(b) does it have jurisdiction to amend the date of dismissal? The 
Application to the High Court was dismissed and the appellant 
company appealed to the Supreme Court. The appeal was allowed. 
The Supreme Court held that the workman was lawfully dismissed 
as held by the Industrial Court. Neither the Industrial Court nor 
the High Court was correct in amending the date of dismissal and 
awarding the compensation as a consequence of such an amended 
 
23  [1995] 3 CLJ 344. 
24 S 20(3) Industrial Relations Act 1967 states that “upon receiving the notification 
of the Director General under subsection (2), the Minister may, if he thinks fit, 
refer the representations to the Court for an award.”
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date, as both matters were outside their jurisdiction in an enquiry 
under s 20(3) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967.
The reasoning from the Supreme Court in Dreamland seems to 
suggest that where no enquiry has been held before dismissal, 
the threshold jurisdiction of the Industrial Court depends on the 
reference by the Minister to find: (a) whether there was enough 
evidence to show misconduct, and (b) whether the dismissal was 
for a ‘just cause or excuse’. It would be a jurisdictional error to look 
into the question of whether or not the dismissal was preceded by 
any enquiry. The defect in the enquiry or the procedural irregularity 
can be cured when the case is referred to the Industrial Court where 
the case will be heard afresh.  The Supreme Court embraced the 
curable principle from the Indian case of Workman of the Motipur 
Sugar Factory Private Limited v The Motipur Sugar Factory Private 
Limited25 as the Court cited:
Where an employer has failed to make an enquiry before 
dismissing or discharging a workman it is open to him 
to justify his action before the Tribunal by leading all 
relevant evidence before it. The entire matter would be 
open before the Tribunal. It will have jurisdiction not 
only to go into the limited questions open to a tribunal 
where domestic enquiry has been properly held, but 
also to satisfy itself on the facts adduced before it by 
the employer whether the dismissal or discharge was 
justified. The important effect of omission to hold an 
enquiry is merely that the Tribunal would not have to 
consider only whether there was a prima facie case 
but would decide for itself on the evidence adduced 
whether the charges have really been made out.
It is clear from Dreamland that as a general principle, failure to 
hold an enquiry is not fatal to the employer as it can be cured. The 
employer would be entitled to justify his action before the Industrial 
Court.
 
The curable principle as reiterated by Dreamland was applied 
in the case of Wong Yuen Hock. The Federal Court in Wong Yuen 
Hock reaffirmed that the Industrial Court was not competent to 
declare the dismissal void purely on the ground of failure to hold 
25  AIR 1965 SC 1803.
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a domestic enquiry, taking into consideration the function of the 
Industrial Court to deal with the “substantial merits of the case 
with urgency and without regard to technicalities”.26 In Wong Yuen 
Hock, Wong, the employee, a claims manager with a basic salary of 
RM3600 a month, was sacked after investigations on irregularities 
in the sale of two motor car wrecks without affording him the 
right to be heard in a domestic enquiry. The right was stipulated 
in his contract of employment. A case of wrongful dismissal was 
referred by the Minister to the Industrial Court under s 20(3) of the 
Industrial Relations Act 1967. The Industrial Court held that Wong’s 
was wrongfully dismissed solely on the procedural ground that he 
had not been given the opportunity to be heard in any domestic 
enquiry. The Industrial Court awarded Wong compensation in lieu 
of reinstatement. The quantum was reduced because of Wong’s 
misconduct. Wong, who was dissatisfied with the reduced amount, 
and his employer, who was aggrieved by the whole award, applied 
to the High Court for an order of certiorari to quash the award. Both 
applications were dismissed and they both appealed. The Federal 
Court allowed Hong Leong’s appeal to the extent of quashing 
the part of award, which held that Hong Leong’s failure rendered 
Wong’s dismissal without just cause or excuse. Wong’s appeal was 
dismissed. The Federal Court in this case, emphasised the function 
of the Industrial Court in dealing with reference under s 20(3) of the 
Industrial Act 1967, which is to deal with the substantial merits of the 
case without regard to technicalities. Therefore, the Industrial Court 
had to determine whether the misconduct was in fact committed 
first and then whether it constituted just cause or excuse for the 
dismissal.27 The Industrial Court was not competent to declare the 
dismissal void on the ground of failure to hold a domestic enquiry 
as it was a matter outside the terms of reference by the Minister.28 
Accordingly, it was held that failure to comply with natural justice 
prior to dismissal at the workplace level was curable at the rehearing 
by the Industrial Court. The Federal Court stated that:
The Industrial Court is an independent statutory 
body capable of reaching a fair result by fair 
means on all matters referred to it. Therefore, if 
there had been a breach of natural justice by the 
employer at the initial stage, it could be cured at the  
 
26  Id. at 754.
27 [1995] 2 MLJ 753 at 762.
28  Ibid. 
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rehearing by the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court 
had committed a jurisdictional error when it held that 
Wong was dismissed without just cause and excuse 
purely on the basis of failure to hold a domestic 
enquiry.29 
 
The Court in Wong Yuen Hock also indicated that the curable principle 
applies to all cases, including those which are covered under the 
ambit of the Employment Act.  In the words of Mohd Azmi FCJ:
The principle that an initial breach of natural justice 
by the employer could be cured by the Industrial Court 
enquiry, applies to all cases, regardless of whether the 
claimant is an employee within the meaning of the 
Employment Act 1955.30 
The statements above may be argued to be an obiter dicta only 
since the claimant in that case, Wong, was not an ‘employee’ under 
the Employment Act 1955. However, it is so unfortunate for the 
employee that this obiter dicta had turned into a ratio decidendi 
when it was applied and extended in Milan Auto, a dismissal case 
where the employee was covered by the Employment Act. 
 
In Milan Auto, the respondent was a mechanic with a monthly 
salary of RM600. He was dismissed without a domestic enquiry 
based on the allegations that he was undisciplined, had on several 
occasion slept during working hours, taken leave without approval 
and refused to see the superior when requested to do so. He made 
a representation that he had been dismissed without just cause or 
excuse by the appellant and the Minister referred the case to the 
Industrial Court under s 20(3) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967. 
The Industrial Court decided in favour of the respondent as failure 
to hold an enquiry was a breach of statutory duty under s 14(1) of 
the Employment Act 1955 and the principle of natural justice. It 
was sufficient to constitute a dismissal without just cause or excuse. 
It was also unnecessary to determine whether or not the alleged 
misconduct, if established, constituted a just cause or excuse for 
dismissal. The appellant applied to the High Court to quash the 
award but it was dismissed. The appellant appealed and the Federal 
 
29  [1995] 2 MLJ 753 at 754.
30  Ibid.
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Court allowed the appeal. The Federal Court once again emphasised 
the function of the Industrial Court under s 20 of the Industrial 
Relations Act 1967, to deal with the substantial merit of the case. It 
was held that failure to determine whether the alleged misconduct 
had been established and whether the proven misconduct constituted 
just cause or excuse for the dismissal would be a jurisdictional error. 
The curable principle was reemphasised and extended in this case 
to cover all private sector employees, regardless of their salary and 
whether or not they fell under the ambit of the Employment Act 
1955. In the words of Mohamed Azmi FCJ:
The breach of natural justice in not holding a statutory 
or contractual domestic enquiry was ‘curable’ by 
an enquiry held by the Industrial Court itself. The 
principle of curable is not limited to a certain category 
of workmen depending on their salaries. In the 
absence of clear words by the Parliament, neither the 
requirement of due enquiry before dismissal in s 14(1) 
of the Employment Act 1955 for employees whose 
earning did not exceed RM1,250 per month, nor the 
subsequent amending Acts were intended to alter this 
policy of the law.31 
 
It should be stressed here that when the curable principle from 
Dreamland was further extended by Milan Auto, the effect on the 
employee became worse to the extent that it might be blatantly 
said that all private sector employees, regardless of whether or not 
they were protected under the Employment Act 1955, did not have 
thus far the right to a pre-dismissal enquiry. As ridiculous as it may 
sound, the employers were not then under any legal obligation to 
follow any procedure before dismissing the employees. The curable 
principle has watered down the right of the employee despite the 
existence of the statutory and contractual requirement to hold such 
enquiry as evidenced in Milan Auto as well as Wong Yuen Hock. 
Contrary to Dreamland, Wong Yuen Hock and Milan Auto, the 
case of Said Dharmalingam marked a significant departure. In this 
case, the employee, a cooler operator, was an ‘employee’ under the 
Employment Act 1955. He was found guilty of attempted theft from 
the brewery at the pre-dismissal enquiry and was dismissed by the 
brewery manager with immediate effect. He was not invited to make a 
31  [1995] 3 MLJ 537 at 359.
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plea in mitigation before the imposition of the punishment. The main 
question of law in Said Dharmalingam was whether the appellant 
who was an ‘employee’ within the meaning of the Employment Act 
1955 would be entitled to have his dismissal declared null, void and 
of no effect if the procedural safeguards provided by the law had not 
been observed at the pre-dismissal inquiry at the workplace level.32 
The employee argued that there was a breach of audi alteram partem 
rule of natural justice when he had not been given the opportunity to 
make a submission in mitigation. On the other hand, the employer’s 
disciplinary guidelines provided that attempted theft was a serious 
offence that dismissal was mandatory upon being found guilty. The 
right to ‘due enquiry’ was held to include the opportunity to present 
arguments on liability and mitigation in punishment.33 However, 
since no other punishment was possible in this case, considering 
the circumstances of the case, it would be a useless formality to 
accord the right to mitigation and thus, the employee’s appeal was 
dismissed.
  
With regard to the main question of law in the above case, the Federal 
Court held that an employee within the ambit of the Employment Act 
1955 has a statutory right to ‘due enquiry’ by his employer before 
being dismissed.34 Edgar Joseph Jr. FCJ in delivering the judgement 
stated:
Speaking generally, where the relationship is that 
of master and servant, we are normally in the field 
of common law of contract, and so, the principle of 
administrative law-which, of course, must include 
the fundamental rule of natural justice expressed in 
the Latin maxim audi alteram partem (hear the other 
side) –would not apply. On the other hand, where the 
employment is in the public sector, or where statutory 
or other protection is conferred, procedural safeguards 
will have to be observed.35 …When, as here, a claimant 
is an employee within the meaning of the Act, he has by 
s 14(1) thereof a statutory right to ‘due enquiry’ by his 
employer, and so, the approach of the Industrial Court 
or for that matter, the High Court, in considering the 
32  Ibid. 
33  Ibid. 
34  [1997] 1 MLJ 352, at 353.
35  Id. At 358.
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question whether the claimant had been dismissed 
without just cause or excuse, would be to examine 
the decision not just for substance but for process as 
well.36 
 
It may be established from the above statements that the right to a 
pre-dismissal enquiry must be observed if the employee is in the 
public service or there is a statutory or other protection conferred 
on the employee.  Where there is a clear statutory requirement such 
as s 14(1) of the Employment Act 1955 to protect an employee, in 
considering whether his dismissal is without just cause and excuse, 
both the substance and the procedures must be taken into account. 
His right to a pre-dismissal enquiry is therefore mandatory and the 
curable principle should not apply. This case is a complete opposite 
of Milan Auto. It should be also be emphasised here that in Said 
Dharmalingam, the cases of Dreamland and Wong Yuen Hock 
were distinguished, as the employees in those two cases were not 
‘employees’ under the Employment Act 1955. However, the case 
of Milan Auto was left out from the discussion. Otherwise, it would 
be very hard to reconcile Said Dharmalingam and Milan Auto as 
the employees in these two cases were both ‘employees’ within 
the ambit of the Employment Act 1955. The conflicting decision 
of these two cases with regard to the application of the curable 
principle, actually, has been the major cause of the earlier mentioned 
confusion and chaos at the lower courts. The researcher is of the 
opinion that in considering future similar cases, the case of Said 
Dharmalingam should be more preferable than Milan Auto as the 
decision in Milan Auto was based on a weak foundation of the ratio 
decidendi in Wong Yuen Hock. 
The application of the curable principle in Malaysia may be argued 
to be inconsistent with the provisions on how the Industrial Court 
shall make its award. The Industrial Court is required to decide 
a dismissal case by reference not only to contractual rights and 
obligations of the parties but also to what is fair and right on the 
ground of equity as stated in s 30(5) of the Industrial Relations Act 
1967. The section provides that “the Court shall act according to 
equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case without 
regard to technicalities and legal form.” What equity requires was 
36  [1997] 1 MLJ 352, at 363.
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explained quite fairly by Weddel & Co. Ltd. v Tepper37 where the 
employer had to give a fair opportunity to the employee to defend 
himself and investigate the case reasonably. Accordingly, s 20(1) of 
the Industrial Relations Act 1967 should be construed to require not 
only substantive fairness compliance but also procedural fairness 
before dismissing a workman. This view was supported by Edgar 
Joseph Jr. FCJ in his obiter in Said Dharmalingam38 where he stated 
that the reasonableness of a dismissal may depend on the procedure 
followed and s 20(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 should be 
interpreted as providing the right to a hearing.39 
Turning to the other basis that requires an employer to hold a pre-
dismissal enquiry and ignore the curable principle, is the common 
law rule of natural justice. The first case that specifically mentioned 
that an employee in the private sector employment has the right to a 
hearing that conforms to the principles of natural justice40 is Syarikat 
Great Eastern Life Assurance Bhd. v Kesatuan Sekerja Kebangsaan 
Pekerja-pekerja Perdagangan41. This principle was extended from 
the case of Surinder Singh Kanda v Government of the Federation 
of Malaya42, which initially was applicable to public servants only. 
The Industrial Court in Syarikat Great Eastern Life Assurance Bhd. 
said inter alia: 
Before the service of an employee can be terminated 
on the grounds that he has committed some misconduct 
which deserves the punishment of dismissal, he should 
be adequately informed of the accusations made against 
him and he should be given a fair opportunity to correct 
or contradict them. One of the principles of natural 
justice is that no one shall be condemned unheard…”43
37 Weddel & Co. Ltd.v Tapper [1980] IRLR 96.
38 The matter was brought before the High Court to seek a declaration on the 
breach of s 14(1) Employment Act 1955 and not under s 20 Industrial relations 
Act 1967.
39  Said Dharmalingam bin Abdullah v Malayan Breweries (Malaya) Sdn Bhd 
[1997] MLJ 352  at p. 361.
40 Pathmanathan, N., Kanagasabai, S. K., & Alagaratnam, S. (2003).  Law of 
dismissal. Singapore: CCH Asia Pte Limited, at 214. 
41  Industrial Court Award No.21 of 1969.
42  [1962] 28 MLJ 169.
43  Cited in Hew S. K. (2013). Dismissal: Salient point to ponder before industrial 
court proceedings in Malaysia (2nd ed.). Selangor, Malaysia: Leeds Publication, 
at 432-433.
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The requirement to comply with the rules of natural justice was 
further strengthened by the pronouncement in Tan Tek Seng v 
Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan & Anor44 which raised 
procedural fairness or the right to natural justice to a constitutional 
footing. The Court of Appeal in Tan Tek Seng directly addressed the 
issue of procedural fairness and its relation to the fundamental rights 
enshrined under art 5(1) and art 8(1) of the Malaysian Constitution. 
Gopal Sri Ram JCA indicated in this case that: 
…the expression ‘law’ which appears in art 5 (1) and 
8(1) of the Federal Constitution includes procedural law 
and, in particular, any procedure prescribed by written 
law. If a particular procedure prescribed by written 
law is found to be arbitrary or unfair or the procedure 
adopted in a given case is held to be unfair, then 
generally speaking, it must be struck down as offending 
art 5(1) read with art 8(1)…in the context of art 5(1), 
if an unfair procedure is resorted to in deprivation of 
a person’s life or liberty, then the decision and the 
procedure are liable to be struck down.45 
Raja Azlan Shah J in the much earlier case of Che Ani bin Itam v 
Public Prosecutor46 had also affirmed that: 
‘Law’ in the context of such constitutional provision as 
Articles 5, 8 and 13 of the Constitution refers to a system 
of law which incorporates those fundamental rules of natural 
justice that had formed part and parcel of the common law of 
England that was in operation at the commencement of the 
Constitution. 
The pronouncement in Tan Tek Seng47 which was reaffirmed by the 
Federal Court in R Rama Chandran48 raised the right to procedural 
fairness to a constitutional level where an individual’s livelihood 
can only be deprived in accordance to it. Hence, the rule of natural 
44  [1996] 1 MLJ 261.
45     Id. at 287.
46  [1984] 1 MLJ 113, at 114. 
47 Tan Tek Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan & Anor [1996] 1 MLJ 
261.
48 R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia and Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 
145.
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justice should always be applicable in an employee’s dismissal 
proceeding, be it in the private or public service. The rule of natural 
justice is primarily concerned with hearing the other side before 
a man is condemned and should be applied before an employee 
is dismissed. It is not meant to be a guiding rule for the rectifying 
process when the case is referred to the Industrial Court. Thus, it 
must be complied with at the pre-dismissal proceedings.  It was 
correctly deduced by Sundra-Karean (2012) that since Tan Tek Seng 
has elevated common law principles of natural justice in Malaysia to 
a constitutional footing, it is arguable that the cases decided before 
that, which held that it was not mandatory to conduct a pre-dismissal 
enquiry, are no longer good law.49 
 
It can also be argued that except as expressly provided by the 
statutes, the pre-dismissal enquiry should be mandatory and there 
should not be any room for curable principle to work. This is based 
on three more reasons. First, the curable principle and its application 
in Malaysia is based on a too broad reiteration of the Indian 
Motipur’s case.50 Second, the mandatory statutory requirement to a 
pre-dismissal enquiry of s 14(1) Employment Act 1955 should not 
simply be exempted by the curable principle at common law, as the 
public policy also forbids parties to breach their statutory duties.51 
Based on this reason, it is strongly recommended that for future 
similar cases, Said Dharmalingam should be referred to instead of 
Milan Auto. Third, the basic principle of industrial jurisprudence 
requires the employer to prove the workman’s guilt and not the 
workman who must prove himself not guilty52 and thus, the pre-
dismissal enquiry must be carried out by the employer before any 
dismissal.
Perhaps, the first reason needs further elaboration. The Indian 
Supreme Court has categorised cases of dismissal for misconduct into 
two: (a) cases where an enquiry is not treated as an empty formality 
but an essential requirement to the legality of the disciplinary 
order, and (b) cases where the dismissal may still be justified by the 
employer before the Tribunal by adducing evidence in the event the 
employer has not conducted an enquiry or the enquiry is found to 
49 Sundra-Karean, op. cit., 146.
50 Workman of the Motipur Sugar Factory Private Limited v The Motipur Sugar 
Factory Private Limited (1965) AIR SC 1803.
51 Sundra-Karean, op. cit., 142.
52 Stamford Executive Centre v Puan Dharsini Ganesan 1 ILR 101.
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be invalid.53 The first category of cases reflects the basic rule as it 
should be and the second category the exceptions to the rule where 
the pre-dismissal enquiry may be dispensed in acceptable situations. 
The Motipur case, according to Anwarul Yaqin (1999), falls into the 
second category where the employer may dispense with the enquiry 
where “it may not be practically possible or expedient to hold an 
enquiry.”54
 
For a better understanding, it might be useful to compare the facts 
of the cases first. In Motipur, 119 workmen started a ‘go-slow’ 
practice in the production, which could cause a breakdown of the 
mill. The Supreme Court decided that any insistence on a pre-
dismissal enquiry was not a proper course as it involved so many 
workers. It would undeniably cause delay and other industrial 
dismissal disputes after the holding of such an enquiry. Thus, the 
employer in that situation may justify on the evidence before the 
Industrial Tribunal that the dismissal was for a just cause. On the 
contrary, the alleged misconduct in Dreamland where the employee 
provoked and instigated dissatisfaction amongst fellow workers, 
was not extraordinary or peculiar enough as in Motipur to warrant 
the exception. There was no imminent ‘danger’ to the company 
and there was only one employee involved in the misconduct. A 
domestic enquiry should have been held in that instance. Similarly, 
in subsequent cases of Wong Yuen Hock where the employee, an 
insurance claim manager, had improperly sold himself two motor 
wrecks and in Milan Auto where the employee, a mechanic, was 
accused of amongst others, indiscipline, being unproductive and 
sleeping on duty, the facts were not extraordinary or peculiar 
enough as in Motipur. Therefore, domestic inquiries should have 
been held first prior to dismissal of the employees to establish the 
misconducts. 
THE ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE
Having discussed the state of the laws relating to the pre-dismissal 
right to be heard in Malaysia, the focus will now be turned to the 
Islamic perspective on the right. It would be examined based on the 
 
53  Anwarul Yaqin (1999). Procedural fairness in dismissals for misconduct: Some 
reflections on judicial trends in Malaysia.  MLJA (2), 140-156, at 142. 
54  Ibid.
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Islamic principle of justice, the penumbra of the right to procedural 
fairness or more specifically, the right to be heard and followed by 
its application. 
The review of the current labour laws to ensure that they are in 
harmony with the Islamic principles and application is necessary 
because of two reasons. The first is to fulfil Muslims’ expectations 
and concerns that the law governing them would be Sharia compliant. 
To the Muslims, if there is a conflict of laws over a certain issue, 
reference should be made to the Qur’an for guidance on how to 
resolve it. The Qur’an emphasises that:
O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the 
Messenger and those in authority among you. And if 
you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the 
Messenger, if you should believe in Allah and the Last 
Day. That is the best [way] and best in result.55 
The second is Sharia law may be more suitable to the local social 
condition and more preferable than adopting the foreign western 
laws from an entirely different nation. Looking back at the history 
before the coming of the colonial powers, the law, which applied in 
Malay states was in fact the Islamic Law, as evidenced in the Malacca 
Laws. Currently, Sharia law applies only to Muslims in the area of 
family laws, laws of succession and Sharia criminal law. Considering 
Malaysia is a mostly Muslim country where the population of Muslims 
reaches 61.3%56 and the effort to harmonise the civil laws and the 
Sharia is on-going, it is only right that some kind of reference should 
be made to the Sharia in reviewing the laws. 
Islamic Principle of Justice and the Right to be Heard
A study by Khairil Azmin and Ashgar Ali (2008) found that it has 
often been overlooked that Islamic law or Sharia had integrated 
elements of justice in the administration and settlement of disputes 
much earlier than the Common Law System and no serious attempt 
had been made to dissect these elements.57 In general, justice in 
55  Surah An-Nisa’ 4:59.
56  Index Mundi, Malaysia religions, January 20, 2018,  8 May 2018 <http://www.
indexmundi.com/malaysia/religions.html>
57 Khairil Azmin Mokhtar & Ashgar Ali Ali Mohamed. (2008). Natural justice: 
The common law and Islamic law approach.  The Law Review, 36-52.
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any legal system is concerned with the correct implementation of 
rights and duties (Mohammad H. Kamali, 1993)58 and elimination 
of all injustice and exploitation (M. Ramzan Akhtar, 1992).59 As 
“Allah commands justice and the doing of good”60, Allah (S.W.T.) 
has provided sufficient guidance in the Qur’an to the believers on 
how to exercise justice through the institution of legal judgment.61 
This legal institution ensures that the same standard of criteria 
will measure everything and if it is monitored properly, it will be 
impossible for an injustice to occur (Mohammad H. Kamali, 1993).62 
Overall, these literatures highlight that the need to do justice and to 
meet a certain procedural standard of justice is fundamental. In the 
employment context, there is still a lack of study on these matters 
from the Islamic perspective (Adnan A. Zulfiqar, 2007).63
Having reviewed the above, it is time to look at the main sources of 
reference for the Islamic Law and principle which are the Qur’an 
and hadith.  The researcher examined how the employees’ right to 
be heard should be perceived based on these sources. As for the 
application of the Islamic law and principle, the researcher looked 
at the statutory provisions in two Islamic countries, namely the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), where Sharia is declared as the source or the main source of 
their legislations.  
The following Qur’anic verses and hadith would point out how 
fundamental the right to justice is. Allah (S.W.T.) ordered man to be 
just and trustworthy as evidenced in the Qur’anic verses below: 
Allah doth command you to render back your trusts 
to those to whom they are due, and when you judge 
between man and man that ye judge with justice. Verily 
58 Mohammad H. Kamali. (1993). Fundamental rights of the individual: An 
analysis of Haqq (Right) in Islamic law. The American Journal of Islamic 
Social Sciences (10:3). 356-357.
59 M. Ramzan Akhtar. (1992). An Islamic framework for employer-employee 
relationship. The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, (9:2), 202-218.
60 The Qur’an, Surah al-Nahl 16:90.
61 Ṭāhā J. al ‘Alwānī,  & Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo. (1995) . The rights of the accused 
in Islam.  Arab Law Quarterly (10:1), 3-16.
62 Mohammad H. Kamali, op. cit., 343. 
63 Adnan A. Zulfiqar. (2007). Relegious sanctification of labor law: Islamic labor 
principles and model provisions. U. PA. Journal of Labour and Employment 
Law (9:2), 421-445. 
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how excellent is the teaching which He giveth you! For 
Allah is He who heareth and seeth all things.’64
If thou judge, judge in equity between them; for Allah 
loves those who judge in equity.65
O ye who believe! Stand out firmly for Allah as witness 
to fair dealing, and let not hatred of others to you make 
you swerve to wrong and depart from justice. Be just: 
that is next to piety: and fear Allah. For Allah is well 
acquainted with all that ye do.66
There are also detailed descriptions of justice in the Qur’an to 
enlighten believers on the attitude they have to adopt to exercise 
justice. True justice in the Qur’an commands man to behave justly 
without discrimination, to protect other’s right, to prohibit violence, 
to side with the oppressed against the oppressor and to help the 
needy.67 This justice calls for the right of both parties to be protected 
when reaching a decision in a dispute. Allah (S.W.T.) commands 
people to rule with justice even if it works against themselves as 
stated in the Qur’an:
O You who believe! Be upholders of justice, bearing 
witness for God alone, even against yourselves or your 
parents and relatives. Whether they are rich or poor, 
God is well able to look after them. Do not follow your 
own desires and deviate from the truth. If you twist or 
turn away, God is aware of what you do.68
Apart from the verses of the Qur’an, there are a few hadith to support 
the importance of upholding justice in disputes. As reported by Abu 
Dawud, Caliph Ali said that the Holy Prophet (S.A.W.) advised him 
to the effect: 
O Ali! People will come to you asking for judgments. 
When the two parties to a dispute come to you, do not 
decide in favour of either party until you have heard all 
64 The Qur’an, Surah An-Nisa (4):57.
65 The Qur’an, Surah Al-Ma’idah (5):42.
66 The Qur’an, Surah Al-Ma’idah (5):8.
67 Harun Yahya (2003). Justice and tolerance in the Qur’an. Singapore: Nick-
leodeon Books Pte Ltd., at 12.
68 An-Nisa 4:135. 
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that both parties have to say. Only in this manner will 
you come to a proper decision, and only in this way 
will you come to know the truth.69
The adherence to justice is not a mere recommendation as there are 
also sanctions and consequences explained in the Qur’an and hadith 
for its violation. The Qur’an states:
O Mankind! We created you from male and 
female, and made you into peoples and tribes 
so that you might come to know each other. 
The noblest among you in God’s sight is that one of 
you who best performs his duty. God is All-Knowing, 
All-Aware.70 
Thus, the employer neglecting the employees’ rights is tantamount 
to zulm (injustice), which is strictly prohibited in Islam and an 
employer who takes away rights of workers should be considered 
an oppressor.71 The Prophet (S.A.W.) also warned the employers to 
“be careful about those who depend on you. Treat them mildly. An 
owner, who mistreats his servant, shall never enter the portals of 
paradise.”72 Abu Musa also reported Allah’s Messenger (S.A.W.) as 
saying: 
Allah the Exalted and Glorious, grant respite to the 
oppressor. But when He lays Hand upon him, he does 
not let him off. Re (the Holy Prophet) then recited this 
verse: Such is the chastisement of thy Lord when He 
chastises the towns (inhibited by) wrongdoing  persons. 
Surely, His punishment is painful, severe.73
As narrated by Abdullah ibn Abbas when this verse was revealed: 
If they do come to thee, either judge between them, 
or decline to interfere....If thou judge, judge in equity 
69 Mohd. Ma’sum Billah & Ahmad Azam  Shariff. (1996). Strict liability? An Is-
lamic jurisprudential response. CLJ (4), lxv. 
70 Qur’an, al-Hujarat 49:13. 
71 Adnan A. Zulfiqar, op. cit., 435.
72 Majma-uz-zawaid Vol.4 p.236, Kanz-ul-ummal Vol.5 p.18 as cited in Ashgar 
Ali Ali Mohamad and Farheen Baig Sardar Baig. (2012). Treatment of migrant 
workers: The Islamic perspective. Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sci-
ences (6:11), 97-105.
73 Sahih Muslim, Book 32, Hadith no. 6253, Ch.13.
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between them.” Banu an-Nadir used to pay half blood-
money if they killed anyone from Banu Qurayzah. 
When Banu Qurayzah killed anyone from Banu an-
Nadir, they would pay full blood-money. So the Apostle 
of Allah (S.A.W) made it equal between them (Sunan 
Abu Dawud, 18:3584). The divine order, revealed in 
the Qur’an and manifested in the Prophet’s words and 
deeds, will last unchanged and in this sense it should 
be emphasised once again that it becomes a necessary 
obligation (wajib) on the believers. 74
Bearing on the fact that the right to be heard is based on the 
fundamental legal right to justice and it is clear from the hadith 
above that the accused’s right to be heard must be granted and it 
is not a mere recommendation, it may be submitted here that from 
the Islamic perspective, the employee’s right to be heard in a quasi-
judicial making process like a domestic enquiry is mandatory. 
Having discussed the Islamic principle of justice as the foundation 
for the right to be heard and its mandatory effect, the following 
discussion will outline the subsequent duty that arises on the part 
of the judges75 and employers as mentioned in the Qur’an and 
hadith. They clearly support the mandatory effect of the employees’ 
right to be heard.  A judge must have knowledge of Islamic Law 
and jurisprudence and the rule of procedure, and must be able to 
decide and settle disputes accordingly.76 Competent and just judges 
are just as important as accurate proof and unshakable evidence to 
achieve legal justice.77 Accordingly, it would be the role of a judge 
to ensure that the evidence is strong based on the process of Islam 
law. As Narrated by Abdullah, Allah’s Apostle said, “Do not wish 
to be like anyone, except in two cases: (a) a man whom Allah has 
given wealth and spends it righteously, and (b) a man whom Allah 
has given wisdom (knowledge of the Qur’an and the Hadith) and 
he acts according to it...”78 The second case must be referring to, 
among others, a judge. The Qur’an emphasises the importance of 
the investigation carried out by judges in order to find out the truth in 
74 Smirnov, A. (1996). Understanding justice in an Islamic context: Some points 
of contrast with Western theories.  Philosophy East and West (46:3), 337-350.
75 In the context of disciplinary proceedings, this is referring to the disciplinary 
committee. 
76 The Mejelle, Article 1793.
77 Khairil Azmin Mokhtar & Ashgar Ali Ali Mohamed, op. cit., 43.
78 Bukhari, Sahih Bukhari, Book 89, Hadith no. 255.
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the administration of justice as it says “O ye who believe, if a wicked 
person comes to you with any news, ascertain the truth, lest ye harm 
people unwittingly, and afterwards become full of repentance for 
what ye have done.”79 All tittle-tattles or reports are to be tested and 
the truth ascertained to avoid any scandal or slander of all kinds.80 
This is further supported by another hadith narrated by Abu Dawud. 
Caliph Ali said that the Holy Prophet (S.A.W.) sent him to Yemen as 
judge and advised him to the effect:
O Ali! People will come to you asking for judgments. 
When the two parties to a dispute come to you, do not 
decide in favour of either party until you have heard all 
that both parties have to say. Only in this manner will 
you come to a proper decision, and only in  this way 
will you come to know the truth.81
Moral sanctions may also be invoked when one, acting as a ‘judge’ in 
a dispute or in the employment law context relevant to this research, 
or acting as a committee member in an employee’s disciplinary 
action, fails to carry out his or her duty. The following hadith by the 
Prophet (S.A.W.) explained the consequences of failing to carry out 
one’s duty as a judge as he stated that: 
Judges are of three types, one who will go to paradise 
and two to hell. The one to go to paradise is a man who 
knows what is right and gives judgment accordingly, 
but a man who knows what is right and acts tyrannically 
in his judgment will go to hell, and a man who gives 
judgment when he is ignorant will go to hell.82 
The above evidence from the Qur’anic verses and hadiths clearly 
support the idea that as a part of the process of ascertaining the truth 
or the investigation process, the other party to the dispute must be 
heard. Then only the decision would be considered as proper. They 
are clear prohibitions for a judge to make a decision before both sides 
are heard. Accordingly, members of the disciplinary committee, who 
act as judges, must guarantee that both parties to the proceedings are 
heard before passing any judgment. It is their duty to ensure that the 
79 Surah al-Hujarat 49:6. 
80 Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The meaning of the holy Qur’an: Text, translation and 
commentaries. (Kuala Lumpur, Islamic Book Trust, 2005), 1119.
81 Abu Dawud, Sunan Abu Dawud, Book 18, Hadith No. 3575. 
82 Id., Hadith No. 3566.
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evidential rules contained in the Islamic law are observed. A just 
decision can never be achieved unless ‘clear proof’ and arguments 
have been presented and the litigating parties have been given the 
proper opportunity to prove their facts and to defend their rights.83 
The curable principle, as applied in Malaysia, which allows the 
employer to dismiss the employee without an enquiry, shall have no 
place under the Sharia. 
Another support for the mandatory effect of a pre-dismissal right can 
also be found in the Mejelle. The Mejelle or Al-Majalla Al-Ahkam Al 
Adaliyyah is the Ottoman’s ‘codification’ of the Sharia concepts and 
rules on civil matters compiled by jurists and promulgated in 1286 H 
(1836 A.D.). Even though the Mejelle was never expressly recognised 
as law in any of the Gulf jurisdictions, in practice it became the ad 
hoc civil code in those jurisdictions84 before the modern codes were 
formed. It remains as an extremely important reference in Islamic 
Law and was applied in most of the Arab countries that were under 
 
the Ottoman rule until their independence after the First World War 
when they promulgated their own civil codes.85 It is obvious from 
the literal reading of art 1816 of the Mejelle that the right to be heard 
is also a mandatory right. The article is laid down below:
When the parties are present in Court for the purpose 
of the trial, the judge shall first of all call upon the 
plaintiff to state his case. If he has previously reduced 
his claim to writing it shall be read over and confirmed 
by the plaintiff. He shall then call upon the defendant 
to answer. Thus, he shall inform the defendant that the 
plaintiff makes such and such claims against him, and 
shall ask the defendant to reply.  
It should be noted that even though the article above is concerned 
with a court’s trial, the right should also be treated likewise in a 
quasi-judicial disciplinary proceeding or a domestic enquiry prior to 
a dismissal of any employee.  
83 Khairil Azmin Mokhtar & Ashgar Ali Ali Mohamed, op. cit., 46.
84 Ballantyne, W. M. (1986). The new civil code of the UAE: A further reassertion 
of the Sharia. Arab Law Quarterly (1:3), 245-246.
85 British Institute of International and Comparative Law, ‘Introduction to 
Islamic Law’, http://www.biicl.org/files/777_introduction_to_islamic_law.pdf. 
(accessed 25 January 2015).
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Application in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates
It may be observed that unlike Malaysia where different employment 
laws apply between the public and the private sector, in KSA, 
Labour Law (Royal Decree No. M/51) 2006 or better known as 
Labour Law 2006 (LL 2006) applies to both sectors with exceptions 
to certain categories of workers as listed in art (7) of the statute.86 
The Royal Decree No. 49 of 1977 allows the public service to 
promulgate further its own regulations87 but for the present purpose, 
the discussion of the legal provisions on the right to be heard in KSA 
will be based mainly on LL 2006. The mandatory procedural aspect 
of the disciplinary action in KSA employment is clearly indicated in 
art (71) LL 2006 where it states:
Disciplinary action may not be imposed on a worker 
except after notifying him in writing of the allegations, 
interrogating him, hearing his defense and recording 
the same in minutes to be kept in his file. The 
interrogation may be verbal in minor violations, the 
penalty for which does not go beyond a warning or a 
deduction of one-day’s is salary. This shall be recorded 
in minutes.
The mandatory effect of the right to be heard, which consists of 
the right to a proper notice and a proper trial, could not have been 
more evidently stated as the requirement of notice and the hearing 
of the employee’s defence are expressly stipulated in the above 
provision. These requirements must be complied with before any 
of the disciplinary penalties under art (66) of the same statute is 
imposed on the employee.88 The disciplinary procedures are minimal 
yet clearly dictated and do not require a reading between the lines 
of a mere two words of ‘due enquiry’ as in s 14(1) of the Malaysian 
Employment Act 1955. Another feature worth highlighting is cases 
which are considered as serious misconducts meriting dismissal are 
86 They are the agricultural workers, domestic workers, seafarers, sportsmen and 
employer’s family members.
87 The Civil Service Regulations can be found in Umm Al-Qura, 82:4068 (2005), 
5-17.
88 Those penalties include warning, fines, withholding allowance, postponement 
of promotion, suspension from work and dismissal in cases set forth by the 
law.
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spelled out by the law in art (80) LL 2006. Those cases are listed 
together with another reinforcement that the employer facing those 
cases is under a legal obligation to give the employee “a chance to 
state his reasons for objecting to the termination.” This may work 
as a second guarantee that the dismissal will only be lawful if the 
employee’s right to be heard is observed. 
 
Turning now to the UAE’s statutory provisions, the main labour 
legislation for the employee in the private sector is the Federal law 
No.8 on the Regulations of Labour Relations 1980 (FLLR 1980) 
while the civil servants are subjected to the Federal Decree Law 
No.11 for 2008 on Human Resources in the Federal Government.89 
Just like KSA, the mandatory state of the right to be heard in 
disciplinary proceedings in the UAE’s private sector employment 
is also not in question anymore. Art (110) FLLR 1980 expressly 
provides:
Any of the penalties prescribed in art 102 may 
not be applied on the employee unless he is 
notified in writing of the charge taken against  
him and unless his statement is heard and his defence 
is investigated and unless all that is recorded in a report 
kept in his personal file…
It can be observed from the above provision, the requirements of 
notice and the hearing of the employee’s statement and defence 
indicate the mandatory effect of his right to be heard before any 
penalty90 can be imposed on him. 
89 Amended by Federal Decree Law No. (9) for 2011 and Federal Decree Law No. 
(17) for 2017. 
90  The penalties are listed in art (102). The article provides  “disciplinary penalties 




3.  Suspension from work with reduced pay for a period not exceeding ten 
days.
4.  Forfeiture of deferment of periodic increment in establishments where such 
increment system is applied.
5.  Forfeiture or deferment of promotion in establishments where the promotion 
system is applied.
6.  Dismissal from service but reserving right to end of service benefits.
7.  Dismissal from service together with forfeiture of all or part of the benefits, 
provided that penalties shall not be imposed for reasons other than those 
specifically prescribed in Article (120) of this Law. 
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With respect to the employee’s right to be heard in the UAE’s 
civil service, the executive rule of the Decree by the Federal Law 
No.11, year 2008 for Federal Government Human Resources and 
amendments provide that any administrative punishment shall not be 
imposed on the employee “unless after carrying written investigation 
with him and given good opportunity to hear his statements and 
defence.”91 It is also clear that this provision indicates that in case 
of misconduct, there must be an investigation and the public servant 
must also be afforded the right to be heard before he is penalised. 
The right is a mandatory right.
It is clear in Islam that legal as well as moral institution in synchrony, 
uphold the right to be heard to be a mandatory right. The accused 
right to be heard in Islam is very much the same with the principle 
of natural justice, the claimant must prove that the accused is guilty 
and not the accused must prove that he is innocent. That is why the 
accused, as in this context, the employee, must be given the right to 
be heard to answer the evidence which are used against him before he 
is dismissed and not afterward the Industrial Court’s proceedings. 
The curable principle as applied in Malaysia can be strongly argued 
to be against the Sharia.  The Sharia guarantees the right to a defence 
and prohibits its denial under any circumstances except where there 
is an admission of guilt by the accused employee.92 It may also be 
observed that there is no exception stated anywhere in KSA and 
the UAE’s statutory provisions where the pre-dismissal right of the 
employee may be dispensed. As opposed to the legal position in 
Malaysia, there are several exceptions to the application of the right 
to be heard.93 
 It should be noted that similar with KSA, the offences meriting dismissal are 
ascertained and clearly listed in art (120) FLLR 1980. 
91 art (91(5)) of the Cabinet Resolution No.13, year 2012. 
92 Mahmud Saedon A. Othman. (2000). An introduction to Islamic law of evidence, 
Trans: Raden Ahmad Shauki R. Hisan. Kuala Lumpur: The open Press (M) Sdn. 
Bhd., at 31. 
93 Refer art 135(1) read with art 132 of the Malaysian Constitution where these 
provisions exclude the Armed Forces services of the right to be heard. Also 
refer art 135(2) of the Malaysian Constitution. The other exception is when the 
employee is dismissed on account of a criminal offence for which conviction 
has been secured in a court of law (refer Malaysia Airlines Systems Bhd v Ramli 
Daud [2000] 2 ILR 319).  
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CONCLUSION
Overall, there are a few notable differences between the Islamic 
countries’ and Malaysia’s statutory provisions. KSA and the UAE 
have clear statutory provisions indicating the right to be heard 
as a mandatory right in both the private and the public sector 
employment whereas in Malaysia, only the public service sector has 
a clear statutory provision guaranteeing the right. It is especially 
provided by regulation 34 and 37, Public Officers (Conduct and 
Discipline) Regulations 1993. The employees in the private sector 
who are covered by the Employment Act 1955 may to a certain 
extent be accorded the right but not for the others. Nevertheless, 
it is so unfortunate that for as long as the curable principle applies, 
there is no definite guarantee that employees in Malaysia have the 
procedural protection before dismissal. This holds true despite the 
argument that s 20(1) Industrial Relations Act 1967 may be construed 
to require the procedural fairness element. 
It may be concluded this far that the issue of whether or not a 
domestic enquiry is mandatory remains unsettled in the private 
sector employment in Malaysia due to the followings facts: (a) 
vaguely defined statutory right to procedural fairness under s 20 of 
the Industrial Relations Act 1967 and (b) the uncertain application 
of the curable principle despite a rather obvious statutory 
requirement of due enquiry under s 14(1) of the Employment Act 
1955. Therefore, a provision exacting the mandatory effect of the 
right in the Industrial Relations Act 1967 is highly recommended to 
cover those who do not fall under the ambit of the Employment Act 
1955. The basic procedural elements of the enquiry should also be 
included in the provision to ensure uniformity of the application of 
the right to be heard in Malaysia.  It should also be emphasised that 
the application of the curable principle should be very limited if not 
discarded altogether considering the weak foundations in backing 
up the principle. The judges should not be too ready to accord the 
curable principle to the status of a doctrine. They should consistently 
insist on the pre-dismissal enquiry. This would, in turn, educate the 
employer to adhere to the rule. Should there be any doubt on how 
to treat this right, Malaysia should take into account the Islamic 
perspective on this matter.
Essentially, the law needs to be reviewed and amended, if necessary 
to ensure procedural rectitude in dismissal proceedings. The 
amendment should include specific statutory provisions governing 
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the mandatory effect of the domestic enquiry and its procedures. 
This is to ensure that domestic enquiry is properly carried out and 
justice is done. Considering that the Industrial Relations Act 1967 
is especially ambiguous on the pre-dismissal right and procedures, 
a specific clause requiring the mandatory pre-dismissal enquiry in 
the Act should be constructed. It may be combined together with 
its most fundamental procedures as constructed in the Labour Law 
provisions in the Islamic countries. Based on the statutory guidelines 
from the Islamic countries above, the construction of the provision 
to be inserted in the Industrial Relations Act 1967 may appear as 
below: 
A workman may not be dismissed except after he is 
notified in writing with theallegation, his statement is 
heard and he is given the opportunity to defend himself 
that his defence is investigated. 
It may be inserted as s 20 (1B) of the existing Act. As for the 
Employment Act 1955, the fundamental procedural requirements 
may be inserted as ss 14 (1A) of the existing provision and may read 
as below:
Any of the penalties prescribed in s 14(1) may not be 
applied on the employee except after he is notified in 
writing with the allegation, his statement is heard and 
he is given the opportunity to defend himself that his 
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